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Gender, Race, and Intersectionality
on the Federal Appellate Bench
Todd Collins
Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, North Carolina
Laura Moyer
University of Georgia, Athens
While theoretical justifications predict that a judge’s gender and race may influence judicial decisions, empirical sup-
port for these arguments has been mixed. However, recent increases in judicial diversity necessitate a reexamination
of these earlier studies. Rather than examining individual judges on a single characteristic, such as gender or race
alone, this research note argues that the intersection of individual characteristics may provide an alternative approach
for evaluating the effects of diversity on the federal appellate bench. The results of cohort models examining the joint
effects of race and gender suggest that minority female judges are more likely to support criminal defendants’ claims
when compared to their colleagues on the bench, even after controlling for other important factors. This suggests that
our understanding of judicial behaviors may be assisted by the inclusion of how individual characteristics overlap
rather than examining those characteristics alone.
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Black women are silenced between the rocks and
the hard places of racism and sexism. One way of
beginning to think about this space is suggested
by the concept of intersectionality. . . . This dual
vulnerability [of African-American women] does
not simply mean that our burdens are doubled, but
instead, that the dynamics of racism and sexism
intersect in our lives to create experiences that are
sometimes unique to us.
—Crenshaw (1992, 1467-68)
Female members of a racial minority occupy a
unique place within society. As this quote from
Kimberle Crenshaw (1992) suggests, female minorities
endure experiences and face challenges distinctive
from Caucasian females or minority males.1 Since the
1970s, the number of female and minority judges has
continued to increase in the federal judiciary. However,
though a great deal of work has explored the nature of
judicial decision making in the federal courts, there is
little evidence to suggest that the recent diversification
of the federal bench has yielded any substantive impact
in the kinds of decisions rendered. The reason for these
“mixed” findings concerning race and gender is that
judges, as with other political elites, are not simply influ-
enced by one individual characteristic but by a host of
personal traits that collectively impact their behaviors.
As Crenshaw suggested, being a member of a minority
group and being a female, or the intersectionality of
gender and race, will create unique experiences for
female minority judges and may lead to unique behav-
iors in judicial decision making. Using an integrated
model, this research note examines the question of
whether this intersectionality influences judicial deci-
sions, as opposed to racial or gender status alone.
Assessing Behavioral Differences
Based on Group Membership
There are two general theoretical perspectives that
seek to explain how social attributes might work to
influence individuals’ behavior. The socialization
model emphasizes the way in which judges, like
other individuals, acquire their political orientations
through a developmental process of socialization
(Easton and Dennis 1969). Similar to the theoretical
underpinnings of symbolic politics research, the
model assumes that cases (as “symbols”) trigger pre-
dispositions that lead to political behavior (Schubert
1965). A second theoretical linkage suggests attrib-
utes are indicators of influences on behavior that are
not connected to a developmental process of social-
ization. Under this approach, a trait may be related
to behavior because it is linked to self-interest or
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identification with a reference group. For example, sub-
stantive representation theory argues that when circum-
stances and discretion allow, public officials will act to
benefit members of groups of which they are a part (e.g.,
Keiser et al. 2002). While it is beyond the scope of this
article to empirically differentiate between these two
broad themes, these theories have lead to more specific
approaches to examining behavioral differences
between group members. Scholarship from various
fields has also specifically examined the relationship
between gender and behavior as well as race and behav-
ior. Concerning gender, Gilligan (1982) suggested that
differences stemming from role orientations developed
during childhood may lead females to arrive at different
conclusions than males. Others posit that substantial
behavioral differences may result from the historical
limitations, both legal and cultural, placed on females
(Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994). Building on these
theoretical groundings, scholars have noted differences
in behaviors based on gender in areas such as voting
behavior (Norrander 2003), running for political office
(Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994), and serving in
legislative bodies (Dolan and Ford 1995; Swers 2002).
By and large, research examining judicial decision
making has not found broad-based support for the
proposition that a judge’s gender influences the deci-
sions rendered. Several studies have found some con-
sistent gender-based differences in employment
discrimination cases, with women judges being more
likely than their male colleagues to support the posi-
tion of the plaintiff (Peresie 2005; Songer, Davis, and
Haire 1994). Male and female judges have also been
found to differ with respect to sentencing decisions
(Gruhl, Spohn, and Welch 1981). Allen and Wall
(1993) found that women were more supportive of
the profemale position and exhibited more extreme
voting behavior than male judges. However, Segal’s
(2000) examination of President Clinton’s district
court judges found that female judges were no more
likely to support women’s issues than male judges. In
the federal appellate courts, Davis’s (1991) matched-
pairs analysis failed to uncover significant differ-
ences between male and female judges, consistent
with Songer, Davis, and Haire (1994), who found no
significant effects for gender outside of the employ-
ment discrimination context. In sum, empirical find-
ings suggest that a judge’s gender may matter in
decision making only in limited circumstances.
Like gender, an individual’s race may shape per-
sonal identity, interactions with others, availability of
life chances, and perceptions about availability of
those chances (Prestage 1991). Opinions about crime
are one area where researchers have found significant
differences between individuals of different races.
African Americans have been disproportionately
impacted by more stringent crime control policies
(Kennedy 1997), are more likely than Caucasians to
have a liberal disposition toward criminal issues
(Browning and Cao 1992) and civil liberties issues
(Pierce, Beatty, and Hagner 1982), are more likely
to lack confidence in the police (Cao and Franks
1996), and are more afraid that the police will arrest
them if they are innocent (National Center for State
Courts 1999). Based on data from the 1995 National
Opinion Survey on Crime and Justice, African
American and Hispanic respondents are more likely
than white respondents to express dissatisfaction with
the criminal court system (Myer 1996). African
Americans are also significantly more likely to per-
ceive bias and discrimination in the criminal justice
system than white Americans, even after controlling
for income, education, age, and class (Hagan and
Albonetti 1982). A recent survey also found that
more than 30 percent of African American respon-
dents and 27 percent of Hispanic respondents said
that treatment of African Americans was “far worse”
than other groups, compared to only 9 percent of
Caucasians that shared that belief (National Center
for State Courts 1999). Studies of political elites also
suggest that race impacts legislative agenda setting
and policy making at the state level (Bratton and
Haynie 1999; Miller 1990).
Concerning judges, disparities have been found
with respect to trial court sentencing and a judge’s race
(Welch, Combs, and Gruhl 1998). President Carter’s
African American male circuit court appointees were
found to be more likely to support liberal outcomes
than their white male counterparts in criminal appeals
(Gottschall 1983). Other findings suggest that racial
minority judges on the U.S. courts of appeals are
more likely to dissent than nonminority judges
(Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004). Another
recent analysis found that substantive representation
with respect to race may occur with African
American judges in search and seizure cases (Scherer
2004-2005). This behavior reflected differences
between African American and Caucasian respon-
dents in public opinion polls on police misconduct,
suggesting that African American judges provide
substantive representation for African American citi-
zens on this issue. However, other studies, such as
Walker and Barrow’s (1985) federal district court
analysis, find no significant effects for race on judi-
cial outcomes.
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The Intersection of Gender
and Race in Judging
It is, however, important to remember that group
membership overlaps between gender and racial cat-
egories. As Kane (1992, 311) wrote, “The intersec-
tion of racial and gender inequalities creates unique
structural positions for black women, black men,
white women, and white men.” The work of Hancock
(2007) and Crenshaw (1989, 1992) focused specifi-
cally on the “intersectionality” of women of color
and how their experiences have been marginalized by
both antiracist groups and feminist groups, each of
which argue that disadvantage occurs along a single,
categorical axis (i.e., race or gender, but not both).
African American women, Crenshaw (1989, 149)
argued, “can experience discrimination in ways both
similar to and different from those experienced by
white women and black men.”
Along these same lines, Angela Harris (1990, 587-
88) argued that current feminist theory ignores the
“multi-vocal” facets of women’s experiences, includ-
ing differences in race, social class, and sexual orien-
tation, and instead bases its understanding of the
category “woman” only on the experiences of white
women. Given these critiques, it is important to take
into account the unique experience of being both
female and a member of a racial minority when
attempting to discern the impact of demographic fac-
tors on judicial behavior.
Little empirical research has examined these
crossroads, although some prior studies have found
unique effects for gender and race. In their experi-
mental study about perceptions of justice, Miller,
Rossi, and Simpson (1986) found evidence that the
intersection between race and gender influences indi-
vidual views on appropriate punishment for crimes.
White men and white women seem to adopt a per-
spective that focuses on the proportionality of pun-
ishment to the crime committed, regardless of the
offender; in contrast, African Americans, particularly
African American women, appear to be more greatly
influenced by offender characteristics, sentence dura-
tion, and mitigating circumstances than by crime
seriousness (p. 332). While black females supported
harsher punishments than males or white females for
some types of crimes, for other violent crimes such as
intentional shootings, rape, and setting a bomb, black
females supported less harsh punishments than
whites or African American males (pp. 327-28).
These findings suggest the existence of structurally
based differences in judgments about justice that
seem to vary by race and gender. Another study,
based on interviews of 106 police officers, found per-
ceived differences based on race, gender, and the
intersection of these two characteristics (Martin
1994). This qualitative study found that African
American women felt they were victims of racial and
sexual discrimination more than white females or
African American males. African American female
officers’ experiences and beliefs also affected how
they conducted their jobs, more so than white women
or minority-male officers:
Black women face uncertainties related to both
co-worker backup and to unpredictable responses
of citizens to black women exercising authority.
They also are aware of the historical role of
police as oppressors in the black community.
These factors contribute to their reluctance to
adopt the policing style characteristic of white
men who are enthusiastic about “aggressive
patrol” and seeking out crime and criminals.
(Martin 1994, 391)
Building from the theoretical contributions of
Crenshaw (1989, 1992) and the experimental work of
Miller, Rossi, and Simpson (1986), our research
empirically tests whether the group membership of
federal appellate court judges has a discernable affect
on their voting behavior. Given the prior studies and
theories on the influence of individual characteristics
on behavior, we expect that female-minority judges
will have unique voting behaviors as compared to the
voting behavior of Caucasian men, minority men,
and Caucasian women. Specifically, we expect the
female-minority judges, being members of two “out-
groups,” will support more liberal outcomes than
whites or minority females. However, to ensure that
intersectionality is indeed influential, we will also
need to test for the effects of race or gender alone.
Data and Measures
To test the influence of intersectionality, we draw our
cases from the Multi-User Database on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals supplemented by the update extending the
sample.2 In our analysis, we utilize only criminal cases
decided between 1977 and 2001, as 1977 marks a time
of increased diversity on the federal bench compared to
previous decades (Goldman 1997). We also relied upon
the Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski (1997) Database on the
Attributes of U.S. Appeals Court Judges3 and the
Federal Judicial Center (see History of the Federal
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Judiciary, www.fjc.gov) to supply information on judge
characteristics. Each case was weighted to represent a
random sample (Songer 1997). The unit of analysis is a
judge’s vote in a given case, which yields 6,219 total
observations, including 348 different judges.4
Our sample includes only criminal cases for several
reasons. First, earlier studies have found race- and
gender-based differences in public opinion on criminal
justice (Curran 1977; Miller, Rossi, and Simpson
1986) and in judges presiding over criminal appeals
(Scherer 2004-2005). Second, criminal cases make up
a large proportion of the circuit court docket, which
increases the generalizability of our findings as well as
the number of observations for the analysis. Finally,
judges exhibit a greater degree of ideological consis-
tency in this issue area than other areas, because crim-
inal cases fall along a single ideological dimension. It
may be argued that, even within the criminal context,
case characteristics vary such that only certain specific
issues in the criminal context should be examined
(e.g., Scherer 2004-2005; Segal 1986). Our study,
however, uses all criminal cases to provide more gen-
eralizable interpretations of judicial decision making.
While the specific legal issues may differ within these
cases, the underlying principles generally remain the
same: balancing the interests of due process versus the
importance of protecting society from criminal activi-
ties. A “law and order” judge should be more likely to
support the prosecution whether the issue is improper
admission of any type of evidence, improper jury
instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. Similarly, a
judge suspicious of the criminal justice system and
protective of due process may be more likely to sup-
port the defendant in a wide range of criminal issues.
For this reason, a broader range of legal issues was
selected, still within the criminal context, to find over-
all trends based on racial and gender characteristics as
well as the joint membership in possible out-groups.
The dependent variable, judicial voting in criminal
cases, is coded as “liberal” (prodefendant) or “conser-
vative” (proprosecution). Our main independent vari-
ables of interest are the judge’s race, gender, and the
intersection of these two variables. To test for the influ-
ence of gender or race alone, we created dummy vari-
ables based on race and gender and conducted models
with these and other control variables. To test the com-
bined effect of being both female and a member of a
minority group, we conducted a cohort analysis,5
defining the cohorts by race and gender: Caucasian
males, Caucasian females, minority males, and minor-
ity females (the excluded, reference category).
One limitation in examining intersectionality
involves the small number of minority female judges
serving on the federal courts of appeals. While the
federal bench has become more diversified, particu-
larly under the Carter and Clinton administrations
(Goldman 1997), only six female minority judges
served during the period included in the study, 1977
to 2001. These female-minority judges included four
African American females and two Hispanic females
(Federal Judicial Center n.d.). Although this small
number may somewhat limit the generalizablity of
any results, the six minority-female judges do repre-
sent the entire universe for this period. Furthermore,
any results that are found concerning the intersec-
tionality of race and gender would be more notewor-
thy given the small sample. As has been noted, “A
factor that is large enough to produce differences that
are statistically significant in a small sample is . . .
much more worthy of one’s attention that a factor that
produces small differences that can only be shown to
be statistically significant within a very large sample”
(Blalock 1979, 163).
To assess the role of race and gender properly, our
model also includes several controls. Judicial ideology
can be a powerful predictor of voting behavior, even on
the courts of appeals (Songer and Davis 1990; Songer
and Haire 1992). We use Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers
(2001) scores as a proxy for judge policy preferences.
We have multiplied these scores by –1 so that they
range from –1 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal).
Likewise, studies have noted that judges born in the
South may be more conservative than their counter-
parts born in other regions even after controlling for
other factors such as the nominating president
(Songer and Davis 1990). Therefore, a dummy vari-
able will be included to control for this regional
effect. We also controlled for the age of the judge, as
age has been linked to judges’ ideological predispo-
sitions in certain case types and in public attitudes
toward law and order (Manning, Carroll, and Carp
2004).
Institutional norms of consensus in the circuit
courts may promote accommodation among panel
members, as is evidenced by the influence of a
panel’s ideological composition on individual judges’
decisions (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004,
2006; Cross and Tiller 1998; Songer 1982). To con-
trol for this group dynamic, the median Giles,
Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) score is included as a
measure of the panel’s ideological predisposition.
Given the potential for rehearing en banc and the pos-
sibility of socialization from other members of the
bench, the model also includes a variable that repre-
sents the ideology score for the median judge in the
circuit for the year in which the case was decided. All
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of these ideology measures should be positively related
to a liberal vote. To account for differences between the
circuits that may not be captured by these controls, we
include dummy variables for all circuits, with the D.C.
Circuit as the excluded category.
Because of the mandatory dockets, many circuit
court cases are routine, where the law and the facts
are clear and judges have little decision-making dis-
cretion. To account for the tendency, we control for
the circuit court’s predisposition to affirm the deci-
sion below by including a variable for the trial court’s
decision. This variable was coded 1 if the lower court
decided in a liberal direction and 0 if it was in a con-
servative direction. As the U.S. government may have
advantages in the resources available to prosecute its
cases (Songer and Sheehan 1992), we also control for
the federal government’s advantages by including a
variable coded 1 if the U.S. argues the liberal position,
–1 if conservative, and 0 if the position was unclear or
if the U.S. government was not a party in the case. This
variable is predicted to be positive in that the circuit
court judges are more likely to rule for the liberal
position if the federal government takes that position.
The court of appeals’ position as an intermediary
court also suggests that it may be responsive to higher
authorities (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994).
Therefore, the model includes a control for the per-
centage of liberally decided Supreme Court cases
dealing with social issues, such as cases involving
criminal rights and procedures, civil rights and liber-
ties, privacy, among others (Segal, Timpone, and
Howard 2000), lagged by one year.
Finally, certain issues may become more salient
over time, possibly due to recent presidential admin-
istrations’ emphases on certain policies and plat-
forms. For example, through the “War on Drugs,”
Presidents Reagan and G. H. W. Bush promoted a
tougher position on crime, including higher penalties
for criminal activities and an increased pressure on
all government officials to get tough on crime
(Whitford and Yates 2003). To control for broad dif-
ferences in policy and the political environment asso-
ciated with presidential administrations, time period
controls were included.
Results
Looking merely at the votes themselves, the trends
appear to support the expectations (see Table 1). As
expected from prior studies, minority male judges
and minority female judges supported the defen-
dants’ position more often than their Caucasian peers
did. Minority women, being members of two out-
groups, cast the highest percentage of liberal votes
(33.9 percent), suggesting that dual membership in
the out-groups of race and gender produces distinc-
tive behavior among that cohort.
However, to better assess the influence of race and
gender, a more refined analysis is needed. Since the
dependent variable is dichotomous, we utilize binary
logistic regression models (Liao 1994), clustering on
each judge to produce robust standard errors (Long
and Freese 2003, 74). To more rigorously test for
unique voting behaviors based on race and gender,
we conducted a logit analysis including a dummy
variable for the race of the judge and then a second
logit with a variable for gender.
Unlike the descriptive findings, however, those
judges belonging to a racial minority were statistically
no more likely to support the defendant’s position than
nonminorities. As the second column in Table 2 dis-
plays, the lack of statistical significance for the race
variable generally supports examinations from other
scholars that find few racial differences in judicial vot-
ing. While other factors, such as the judge’s ideology
and case-based factors such as the panel ideology and
the lower court’s decision influence judicial voting,
distinctions in judicial voting cannot be made from
examining the judge’s race alone.
To examine the possibility of unique voting patterns
for women judges, we conducted a similar model by
including a variable for the judge’s gender. As with the
racial variable in the previous model, the third column
of Table 2 indicates that no statistically significant
differences appear between male and female judges.
While other variables again appear important, the
gender of the decision maker does not appear to be an
influential factor in judicial voting in criminal cases.
While it is difficult to prove a negative through the
null findings for race and gender in Tables 2, these
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Table 1
Voting by Judge Race and Gender:
Criminal Cases before the U.S. Courts
of Appeals (1977-2001)
Race and Gender Percentage of Percentage Percentage of
Cohort (Number Conservative of Liberal the Total Votes
of Judges) Votes Votes in Sample
Caucasian males (273) 80.0 20.0 84.1
Caucasian females (38) 77.0 23.0 7.6
Minority males (31) 75.3 24.7 7.3
Minority females (6) 66.1 33.9 1
All (348) 79.3 20.7 100
results give a strong indication that gender and racial
differences alone do not produce significant differ-
ences in the decision making of the appellate judges.6
Still left unexplored, however, is the question of joint
membership in these groups, or the intersection of race
and gender. Table 3 displays the result of a cohort analy-
sis, utilizing the minority female cohort as the base term.
Since their membership in two out-groups and the
descriptive statistics suggest that female minority judges
are more likely to cast prodefendant votes than white
males, white females, or minority males, then we should
expect that the coefficients for all other cohort variables
will be negative in the model.
As expected, the results in Table 3 indicate that each
cohort is more likely to support a conservative position
when compared to votes cast by minority-female
judges. The sign of the estimated coefficient for each
cohort variable is negative, and the relationships are sta-
tistically significant, even after controlling for other fac-
tors such as individual judge ideology, panel ideology,
and the lower court decision. While the earlier results
did not support the proposition that behaviors differ-
ences exist based on gender or race, alone, the analy-
sis supports the position that being female and a
racial minority influences judicial decision making.
Examining the predicted probabilities (not shown)
provides another means by which we may explore the
differences in judicial voting. Holding all other vari-
ables at their means, the model predicts that minority-
female judges will support the criminal defendant’s
position in 25.91 percent of the cases. White-male
judge were predicted to support a liberal outcome in
19.01 percent of their cases, white-female judges in
17.52 percent, and minority-male judges in 16.15
percent. All predicted probabilities were statistically
significant at a 95 percent confidence interval. Thus,
female-minority judges were approximately between
6 to 10 percent more likely to support a liberal out-
come than males or Caucasian females. While the
other cohorts are statistically indistinguishable from
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Table 2
Racial and Gender Differences—
Logit Model: Likelihood of a Liberal
Vote in Criminal Cases, U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 1977-2001
Racial Differences Gender Differences 
in Judicial Voting: in Judicial Voting:
Coefficient Coefficient 
(Robust Standard (Robust Standard
Variable Error) Error)
Individual judge controls
Race –.112 (.164) —
Gender — –.010 (.100)
Judge’s ideology .416*** (.127) .394** (.128)
South –.287* (.121) –.281* (.120)
Judge’s age during case –.005 (.004) –.055 (.004)
Case-specific controls
Panel median ideology .876*** (.168) .874*** (.168)
Circuit ideology median .065 (.204) .069 (.204)
Lower court decision .734*** (.096) .732*** (.097)
U.S. government position .441*** (.075) .440*** (.075)
Supreme Court liberalism –.006 (007) –.006 (.007)
Year and circuit controlsa
1977-1981 .429*** (.107) .432*** (.107)
1994-2001 .195* (.088) .191* (.090)
First Circuit –.848*** (.210) –.835 (.203)
Seventh Circuit –.945*** (.182) –.953*** (.178)
Eighth Circuit –.847*** (.192) –.838 (.189)
Constant –.548 (.323) –.576 (.326)
Wald chi-square 388.59 386.85
Prob > chi-square .000 .000
Pseudo-R2 .068 .068
N 6,219 6,219
a. Due to space limitations, only those circuit dummy variables with sta-
tistically significant coefficients are reported.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
Table 3
Logistic Regression Estimates: Likelihood of a
Liberal Vote in Criminal Cases, U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 1977-2001
Coefficient (Robust
Variable Standard Error)
Racial cohorts
Caucasian-male judge –.399* (.171)
Caucasian-female judge –.499** (.175)
Minority-male judge –.596** (.231)
Other individual controls
Judge’s ideology .420*** (.121)
South –.295* (.122)
Judge’s age during the case –.005 (.004)
Case and circuit controls
Panel median ideology .877*** (.168)
Circuit ideology median .076 (.205)
Lower court decision .735*** (.097)
U.S. government position .442*** (.075)
Supreme Court liberalism –.007 (.007)
Year and circuit controlsa
1977-1981 .424*** (.107)
1994-2001 .197 (.090)
First Circuit –.843*** (.204)
Fourth Circuit .344* (.174)
Seventh Circuit –.978*** (.177)
Eighth Circuit –.838*** (.189)
Constant –.133 (.340)
Wald chi-square 416.26
Prob > chi-square .000
Pseudo-R2 .068
N 6,219
a. Due to space limitations, only those circuit dummy variables
with statistically significant coefficients are reported.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
each other, a unique pattern of judicial decision
making emerges concerning female minority judges.7
Conclusions
When examining race and gender in isolation, this
study joins others in finding no results. However, unlike
earlier studies of federal court diversification, we do find
that there are significant differences in the voting behav-
ior of minority female judges. They are significantly
more likely than minority males, Caucasian females,
and Caucasian males to support criminal defendants’
claims, even after controlling for ideology and other
important factors. This finding lends credence to argu-
ments made by Crenshaw (1989, 1992) and others that
minority women may have a distinctive identity that dif-
fers significantly from Caucasian women and minority
males. While surveys and studies show race and gender-
based differences of opinion on criminal matters, female
minorities may share common opinions that are even
stronger than the subgroups to which they belong. These
common opinions may be the result of shared socializa-
tion or, alternatively, the result of a conscious decision to
provide substantive representation for the group with
whom these judges most closely identify. Although it is
beyond the scope of this analysis to distinguish between
these two explanations here, future research on intersec-
tionality may shed more light on whether one or the
other of these explanations may further clarify these
unique voting patterns.
Clearly, there are limitations to this study. The sam-
ple includes a small number of minority female judges,
all of whom were appointed by either President Carter
or President Clinton, and these limitations affect the
generalizability of our results. However, unlike past
research, this study found clear differences among this
small group as compared to their counterparts.8 The
fact that statistically significant findings were achieved
despite the small N may provide credence to the
prospect that this is indeed a unique voting group of
judges. Rather than undermine the current results, we
argue this necessitates the importance of further atten-
tion to the theory underlying these characteristic cross-
roads. For example, as of fall 2006, President George
W. Bush had appointed three minority female judges to
the courts of appeals, including Judge Janice Rogers
Brown, a controversial nominee who was involved in a
Senate filibuster (Babington 2005). Future studies that
include these new female minority judges are needed to
support and reevaluate theories concerning dual out-
group status. Additionally, our findings demonstrate
the importance of group identification under certain,
but by no means all, conditions. Here, criminal justice
appears to be an issue area that is salient in terms of both
the race and gender of judges. Further research should
explore the extent to which this cohesion among minor-
ity females exists in other types of cases brought before
the courts of appeals and other judicial settings.
Furthermore, this study suggests that researchers
should continue to examine the effects of overlapping
characteristics rather than certain characteristics singu-
larly. Our findings suggest the need to focus more upon
the overlap of many different characteristics to under-
stand the importance of a judge’s background and expe-
riences upon the decisions they make. For example,
being raised in a family of low wealth, alone, may
appear to have little impact on a judge’s decisions.
However, the overlap of prior wealth and other charac-
teristics, such as race, gender, or other personal traits,
may indeed influence judges and other political elites’
behaviors. While the findings in this study are important
in understanding judicial behaviors, they also raise the-
oretical implications for studying the actions of those
political elites outside of the courtroom. As scholars
continue to refine their measures of personal character-
istics and examine new ways of explaining behaviors,
the intersectionality of personal traits should be an
important factor for exploration into political actors’
decisions and behavior.
Notes
1. For the purposes of this analysis, “minority” refers to
African American, Hispanic, or Asian individuals; and
“Caucasian” refers to individuals who are Caucasian white.
2. The Multi-User Database on the U.S. Courts of Appeals con-
tains published appellate opinions from 1925 to 1996 and is avail-
able at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/appctdata.htm.
The updated database is funded by the National Science
Foundation (SES-0318349 and is available at http://www.wmich
.edu/nsf-coa/.
3. The judge attribute database can by found at the S. Sidney
Ulmer Project at the University of Kentucky, http://www.as.uky
.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/appctdata.htm.
4. The lack of independence between observations is
accounted for by specifying the Huber/White/sandwich estimator
(Huber 1967; Rogers 1993; White 1980). Base terms will include
cases decided in years 1982 to 1993 and the D.C. Circuit.
5. Cohort analysis was selected over interaction terms because
the former allows for comparisons between groups, rather than com-
paring minority-female judges to all other judges. An interactive
model (not shown) was also conducted, and the interaction of gen-
der and race was statistically significant, indicating that minority
females are more likely to support liberal outcomes than all other
groups, collectively. However, the cohort analysis allows conclu-
sions to be drawn as to whether minority-female judges were more
likely to support liberal outcomes than each group, individually.
6. The p-value for the minority-judge variable in the second
column in Table 2 was .495. The p-value for the gender variable
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in the third column of Table 2 was .924, suggesting that neither
variable was statistically significant at generally acceptable con-
fidence levels.
7. A model assessing the joint effects, utilizing an interactive
variable (Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004), was also conducted. The
interactive effects (not shown) of being a female and a minority
have a statistically significant and positive influence on judicial
voting, indicating that minority female judges have a higher like-
lihood of supporting the defendant’s position, even after control-
ling for the other independent variables.
8. While most of these were Clinton appointees, a separate
analysis (not shown) indicates that even within the Clinton
appointees, female-minority judges were statistically more likely
to support the defendant’s position than were other Clinton
appointees overall.
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